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Editorial
Insurance, genetic testing and familial cancer:
Recent policy changes in the United Kingdom
P J Morrison
In the United Kingdom, concerns about the
consequencesofgenetictestingandtheeligibility
for life assurance have worried families wanting
to pursue genetic testing forlateronsetdisorders
suchasfamilialcancers andneurologicaldisease.
The recent history and development of the
insurance and genetic testing guidelines in the
UK is interesting and relevant, because it is the
onlycountryinEuropetohavehadarecentmajor
changeininsurancerecommendations. Insurance
companies have driven the changes, which
culminated in the agreement of the UK
Government and the Association of British
Insurers on afive-yearmoratorium announced at
the end ofOctober 2001. This review details the
eventsleadingtotheintroductionofamoratorium,
and the implications for families with a family
history of a familial cancer.
BACKGROUND
A family history of cancer is now universally
recognised as a major risk factor for developing
cancer and demand for appropriate clinical
servicesisfuelledbypublicityinboththepopular
media and the professional literature. Within the
pastfewyears, cancergeneticclinicshavesprung
up in almost every major medical centre and all
are hard pressed to cope with the numbers of
referralsl-31. Theinsuranceimplicationsofgenetic
testing are complex and this review serves to
reflect recent changes in government policy and
in the thinking of the insurance industry in the
United Kingdom. The situation in the USA is
different as within a private healthcare system,
insurers often encourage or fund genetic testing
as they can see the preventative value of such
tests in helping initiate cancer screening
programmes. The situation in the Republic of
Ireland is defacto the same as the UK as most
insurers inIrelandhaveheadoffices inthe UKor
vice versaandoperate the samepolicy ongenetic
testing and insurance.
INSURANCE ISSUES
Fisherpredictedtheuseofgenetic informationin
assessing insurance risks as long ago as 1935[4'.
Several cancer genetic tests are now available
routinely. Fortestinginfamilialbreastandovarian
cancer, the main tests asked for are BRCA1 and
BRCA2, and less frequently PTEN and TP53. In
familial colorectal cancer, familial adenomatous
polyposiscoli(FAP)andhereditarynon-polyposis
colon cancer (HNPCC) tests are in common use.
Huntington's disease (HD), an autosomal
dominantneurodegenerative disorder, hasbeena
rolemodel forthis typeoftestinginadultgenetic
diseases. Several ethical and legal problems
already have been recognised5'61. Clearly, there
is a difference between more highly penetrant
autosomal dominant diseases such as HD, and
such diseases as breast and colon cancer. Life
tables and penetrance have been worked out for
HD and it is possible to predict the age of death
within a narrow range. Cancers due to single
genes such as breast cancer, which constitute
only 5-10% of a predominantly non familial
common cancer, present more difficulty, as few
accurate lifetime risk tables are available or are
difficult to compile with limited accurate
penetrancedata17'81. IfgenetictestssuchasBRCA1
and BRCA2 are used in insurance, they should
only be used in conjunction with other
information.
DEFINITION OF A GENETIC TEST
Agenetictesthasbeendefinedas "anexamination
ofthe chromosome, DNA or RNA tofind out if
thereisanotherwiseundetectablediseaserelated
is genotype, which may indicate an increased
chance ofthat individual developing a specific
disease in thefuture"[9J.
The UK advisory committee on genetic testing
(ACGT) definition°101 defines it as "a test to
detect thepresence or absence of, or change in,
aparticular gene or chromosome".
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Familyhistorydatahasbeenusedforyears andis
generally accepted by insurance companies
although there may be considerable inaccuracy
infamilyhistorydata.Usingsuchhistorywithout
goodvalidatedreasonsisbadpracticeandshould
be challenged - further evidence needs to be
collected to demonstrate whether such use is
really fair or effective.
In the UK, 95-97% oflife insurance policies are
accepted at no increased premium. Only about
1% are declined, and 2-4% are rated upl'1 12].
There is no analysis ofthese figures for specific
diseases. Themainreason forrefusal or 'loaded'
premiums is the above average sum assured, and
not the type of 'high risk' individual assessed.
Risks forinsurerswillbesmallifthepolicyvalue
is low[131, for example under £100,000.
THE RECENT UK POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN
INSURANCE AND GENETIC TESTING
In the UK the main concern is about the
consequences of cancer genetic testing on the
eligibility for life assurance[14'151. The recent
history and development of the insurance and
genetic testing situation in the UK is interesting
and relevant, because it is the only country in
Europe to have had a recent major change in
insurance recommendations. Insurance
companieshavedriventhechanges.Before 1995,
the insurance industry paid little attention to
progression of genetic testing. A House of
Commons Science and Technology Select
Committeereportedonhumangeneticsin 1995,[16]
and included insurance issues. The committee
foundalackofpublishedresearchonunderwriting
andadverseselection,withtheinsuranceindustry
relyingontheprincipleofthe 'righttounderwrite'.
Shortlyafterthepublication ofthereport,theUK
Government gave the ABI one year to formulate
proposals thatwould meetdemands foraccess to
insurance. At the same time, they announced the
formation of a Human Genetics Advisory
Commission (HGAC). The HGAC was
established in December 1996 as anon-statutory
advisory body to report to the government on
variousdevelopments ingenetics. Itconcentrated
on insurance as its first task. The insurance
industry in 1997 announcedthe appointmentofa
genetics adviser and drafted a code of practice.
ThefirstHGACreportwaspublishedinDecember
l997['3]. The report recommended a two-year
moratorium on genetic testing. Its conclusions
are shown in Table 1. The Association ofBritish
TABLE 1:
Recommendations on genetic testing &
insurance ofthe Human Genetics Advisory
Commission ofthe UK (1998).
1. Apermanentbanontheuseofgenetictesting
is not appropriate. Recommendation is for
introduction of a moratorium on genetic
testing for at least 2 years.
2. There is not sufficient predictive ability of
genetictestsatthemomenttoallowaccurate
risk assessment.
3. The life insurance industry could currently
withstand limited adverse selection if
nondisclosure of test results was current
policy.
4. There is a perception of unacceptable
discrimination - this may deter testing that
may lead to beneficial treatment.
5. Arrangements forconfidentiality ofdataare
adequate under current practice.
6. No company should require taking of a test
as a prerequisite ofobtaining cover.
7. Increased research and collaboration
between industry and science is required to
improveknowledgeofactuarialimplications
ofgenetic factors.
8. There should be a robust appeals procedure
as part of any new system.
9. Recommendations are primarily relating to
lifeinsurancebuttheprinciplesaboveshould
applapplytoothertypesofhealthinsurance.
Insurers (ABI), abody representing around 95%
of insurers in the UK, also reported their
recommendationsatthesametimeastheHGAC81.
TheABIcodeofpracticeforgenetictestingcame
intoeffectinJanuary 1998. Thecodehad several
important features (Table 2) and applied to all
insurance, including life, permanent health,
critical illness, and long-term care and medical
expenses. Most 'relevant' UK insurance is
predominantly life insurance linked to personal
pensions, and property insurance (mortgage
cover). As the UK National Health Service
provides freehealth care, health insurance is less
frequently purchased than in the USA, although
therehasbeenarecentincreaseinsalesofpersonal
health insurance cover policies. The situation
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TABLE 2:
Association ofBritish Insurers code of
practiceforgenetic testing (1998).
1. Insurance companies will not insist on
genetic tests.
2. Genetic test results will only affect
insurance ifthey show a clearly increased
risk of illness or death. A low increase in
riskwillnotnecessarilyaffectthepremium.
3. Insurance companies will always seek
expert medical advice when assessing the
impactofgenetic testresults oninsurance.
4. Insurers may take account of a test result
only when reliability and relevance have
been established.
5. Applicants forinsurance will notbe asked
to take a genetic test, but existing test
results should be given to the insurance
company when it asks arelevant question,
unless it has said this information is not
required.
6. Existing genetic test results need not be
disclosedinapplications forlifeinsurance
up to £100,000* which are directly linked
to a new mortgage for the purchase of a
house to be occupied by the applicant(s).
7. Anapplicantwillnotberequiredtodisclose
the result of a genetic test undertaken by
another person (such as a blood relative),
and one person's test information will not
affect another person's application.
8. The reason for an increased premium or
rejection of an insurance application will
be provided to the applicant's doctor on
request.
9. Insurers will not"cherry pick" by offering
a "preferred life" lower than normal
premiums on the basis oftheir genetic test
results.
10. An independent adjudication tribunal is
being setuptoconsidercomplaints, which
are unresolved.
11. Each year chief executives will need to
demonstrate howtheyhavecomplied with
the code.
* Extended to £300,000 for all classes of insurance in May
2001 andto£500,000forlifeinsurance inOctober2001
differs greatly from the USA insurance market,
which is dominated by private health insurance.
The Government responded to the HGAC in late
1998 and although it didn't accept the proposed
moratorium, it established a genetics and
insurance advisory committee (GAIC in April
1999 in an attempt to validate genetic tests
proposed by the Association ofBritish Insurers.
The ABI had listed matrices of autosomal
dominant, autosomal recessive and X-linked
recessive diseases for potential validation.
Initially alist ofaround 30 tests was drafted, and
then shortened to eight Autosomal dominant
diseases. Adult polycystic kidney disease was
thendroppedas atestasultrasound scanningwas
found to be reliable and easier to institute than a
genetic test The list of seven conditions (see
Table 3) includes Huntington's disease, multiple
endocrine neoplasia (MEN-2), breast cancer
(BRCAI & 2 genes), familial adenomatous
polyposis coli (FAP), Alzheimer disease,
hereditarymotorandsensoryneuropathy(HMSN)
andmyotonicdystrophy.Thelistwasneveropenly
published.
TABLE 3.
List ofseven conditions andgenetic tests
recommended by the ABIas relevantfor
insurance purposes genetic tests of ABI
Condition Genes tested for
*Huntington disease HD
*Early onset familial
Alzheimer disease APP, PSI and PS2
*Hereditary breast and
ovarian cancer BRCAJ and BRCA2
Myotonic Dystrophy MDPK
Familial adenomatous
polyposis APC
Multiple endocrine
neoplasia RET
Hereditary motor and
sensory neuropathy PMP22
* Reduced to only these three by end December 2000
The role of GAIC was in validating the tests
proposedbytheABI. Itdeemed atest suitable for
use in assessing insurance proposals if it met
three conditions:
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1. Technical relevance - is the test technically
reliable and does it accurately detect the
specific changes sought for the named
condition?
2. Clinical relevance - does a positive result in
thetesthave any implications forthehealth of
the individual?
3. Actuarialrelevance-dothehealthimplications
make any difference to the likelihood of a
claim under the proposed insurance product?
The first condition for validation, Huntington's
Disease, wasapprovedinOctober2000asreliable
and relevant for the purposes of life insurance
policies. The insurance companies accepted this
rulinganddisclosedthattheywouldnotusetests,
which were not received for approval by GAIC
by the end of 2000. Two more conditions were
submitted and are currently being processed -
early onset familial Alzheimer disease and
hereditarybreast/ovariancancer.Regrettably,the
insurance companies tookthe view thatalthough
they had withdrawn other tests including the
cancers FAP and MEN-2 as they felt genetic
testing by middle age was not going to add much
to family history and clinical examination, they
refused to allow the results of negative (i.e. not
carrying a family mutation) tests which would
havebeen advantageous in securing normalrates
in those penalised by family history of these
disease. Although there was a large amount of
public opposition to the first approval of HD by
GAIC, therole ofGAIC has beenuseful in thatit
forced the ABI to consider the topic seriously,
rather that its' previous view that no problem
existed. Italsoputtheonusoninsurerstoproduce
facts and a case to submit evidence to GAIC
regarding reliability and forjust these reasons, 5
ofthe 8 tests have now been dropped. GAIC has
all types ofinsurance as its remit andnotjustlife
insurance, which is most problematic in the UK
and has forced the consideration of health and
critical illness and long term care issue onto the
agenda (issues which are particularly relevant in
the USA).
Otherissuesincludingethical andsocialissuesin
relation to insurance are not covered by GAIC
and are the remit of the Human Genetics
Commission (HGC). The HGC was established
in May 1999 following a major government
reorganisation of committees and it absorbed
several predecessor committees including the
HGAC, which stopped functioning in December
1999. In December 2000, the HGC published a
consultation on public opinion on several issues
and showed that there was strong opposition to
the use of genetic test results by insurance
companiesE171. This was confirmed in a MORI
opinion survey published by the HGC in March
2001[18] and the HGC concluded that the level of
publicconcernovertheissuerequiredaresponse.
This information coincided with the new House
of Commons Committee on Science and
technology reporti19' also in March 2001. The
committee took both oral and written evidence
from several bodies including the insurance
companieswithinandoutsidetheABI.Thereport
was severely critical ofthe insurance companies
and the conclusions (including recommending a
two year moratorium) are listed in table 4.
The HGC published a statement in May 2001
recommending interim recommendations on the
useofgeneticinformationininsurance(Table5).
These included an immediate moratorium on the
use of genetic tests by the insurance companies
for a period ofnot less than 3 years. This would
allow time for a full review of evidence and
regulatory options. The use of family history
information was allowed but the HGC specified
that they would discuss this and address how
insurers use family history information. They
also placed a ceiling on the recommended
moratoriumof£500,000, toprotecttheinsurance
industry from significant financial loss. They
recommendedthatlegislationmightbeneededto
enforcethemoratoriumbecause ofthefailings of
thecurrentsystem. TheABIrespondedbyissuing
on the same day, an extension to their existing
moratoriumtoinclude all classes ofinsurance up
to £300,000 (previously only mortgage related
policies up to £100,000).
The UK government response to both the House
of Commons select committee report and the
HGC interim recommendations was published
on 23rd October 2001[201. The key features are
summarized in table 6. The Government and the
ABIhave announced a5-yearmoratorium on the
use of genetic test results by insurers. The
moratorium will apply to life insurance policies
up to £500,000 and critical illness, long-term
care insurance and income protection up to
£300,000 for each type of policy. In policy
applications above these limits, the insurance
industry may use genetic testresults where these
tests have been approved by GAIC. Legislation
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TABLE 4.
Some ofthe House ofCommons Science and
technology committee recommendations
May 2001
1. Insurance companies should detail exactly what
genetic tests they will consider (both positive and
negative) for what conditions and under which
circumstances as soon as possible.
2. Commercial insurance companies should have
accesstothesameinformationasapplicants,where
it is relevant and reliable - but only ifthere are no
adverse consequences for society.
3. It is not certain at present that the information
obtained from positive genetic tests is relevant to
the insurance industry.
4. Insurers have given test results a predictive
significance that cannot at present bejustified.
5. Insurers appear to be more interested in
establishing their future right to use genetic test
results in assessing premiums than in whether or
not they are reliable or relevant
6. Insurers must publish more data, which
unequivocally supports the changes made to
insurancepremiums basedonpositivegenetic test
results.
7. Insurers should publish clear explanations as to
exactly how such factors as early diagnosis and
treatment are factored into their actuarial
calculations
8. The small number ofcases involving genetic test
results could allow insurers to ignore all genetic
test results until their scientific and actuarial
relevance is firmly established.
9. Theviewthatignoringgenetictestresultsiscostly
is contradicted by the actions ofatleast 3 insurers
who choose to ignore tests for the short term.
10. We recommend that insurers take into account
negative test results.
11. Insurers should explain and publish how they use
family history in assessing premiums.
12. Adequate independent research to discern the
impactoftheuseofgenetictestresultsbyinsurance
companies should be carried out.
13. The distinction between research and diagnostic
tests shouldbeclearlyunderstoodbythoseseeking
to use the results and the statement that results
from research will not be used should be
incorporated into the ABI code ofpractice.
14. TheABImustacttoconvincethegovernmentand
public that the code ofpractice is being complied
with, andinsurers mustprovethatthey arecapable
of regulating themselves effectively and
thoroughly.
TABLE 5.
HGC moratorium recommendations
May 2001
1. No insurance company should require
disclosure of adverse results of any genetic
tests, or use such results in determining the
availability or terms of all classes of
insurance.
2. Recommendation is for introduction of a
moratorium on genetic testing for not less
than three years. This will allow time for a
full review ofregulatory options and afford
the opportunity to collect data, which is not
currently available. The moratorium should
continueiftheissueshavenotbeenresolved
satisfactorily within this period.
3. The moratorium will not affect the current
ability of insurance companies to take into
account favourable results of any genetic
testresult, whichtheapplicanthaschosento
disclose.
4. HGC will address the issue as tohow family
history information is used by insurers.
5. An exception is made for policies greater
than£500,000. asprotectionfromsignificant
financial loss.
6. Only genetic tests approved by the genetics
and insurance committee (GAIC) should be
taken onto account for these high value
policies. There remains a need for an expert
body ofthis kind.
7. In view of the failings of self-regulation,
independentenforcementofthemoratorium
will be needed. The HGC believes that
legislation will benecessary to achieve this.
has not been introduced; however independent
monitoring ofthe ABI code ofconduct will take
placepossiblythroughanenhancedroleforGAIC
in monitoring both insurance compliance and
customer complaints. It is also to review the
composition of the GAIC committee with
extension of its' membership. The moratorium
has not been extended to use of family history
data, andthewholemoratoriumwillbereviewed
after3 years.Animportantnotefromthepatients'
perspective is thatthe use ofnegative test results
is encouraged by the insurer subject to
confirmation in most cases by a geneticist ofthe
relevance of the result.
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TABLE 6.
Government andABIagreed moratorium
October 2001
1. There will be afive yearmoratorium on the
use of genetic test results by insurers.
2. Themoratoriumwill apply tolifeinsurance
policies up to £500,000 and critical illness,
long term care insurance and income
protection up to £300,000 for each type of
policy.
3. In policy applications above these limits,
the insurance industry may use genetic test
resultswherethesetestshavebeenapproved
by GAIC.
4. Legislation has not been introduced,
howeverindependentmonitoringoftheABI
code ofconduct will take place through an
enhancedrole forGAIC inmonitoring both
insurance compliance and customer
complaints.
5. The moratorium has not been extended to
use offamily history data
6. The whole moratorium will be reviewed
after 3 years.
7. Theuse ofnegative testresults in obtaining
normal premiums is encouraged by the
insurersubjecttoconfirmationinmostcases
by ageneticistoftherelevanceoftheresult.
THE SITUATION IN OTHER EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
Several European countries have no legislation
or guidelines on insurance and genetic testing.
Countries that have some guidelines have a
moratorium on the use of genetic tests. For
example, in France, the moratorium is up to five
years, whilst in the Netherlands, it has been
extended indefinitely. Once a moratorium has
been introduced, it is difficult to find sufficient
scientific evidence tojustify lifting a ban on the
useofgenetictestinginunderwritingpractice[14 .
In Austria, the 1994 gene technology law states
that employers and insurers are forbidden to
obtain, request, accept or use results of genetic
analyses. In Belgium, a 1992 Non-marine
insurance law allows medical examinations etc.
to be based only on past medical history
establishing the applicant's medical state, and
not on genetic analysis techniques capable of
determining future state of health. In Denmark,
the amendment to the insurance contracts act
1997, allows insurers only to ask for HIV tests
and family history when the sum insured is high
and over a certain level. In France, the 1994
French federation of Insurance Companies
(FFSA)issuedastatementsayingthatfor5 years,
the FFSA will not use genetic information when
determining applicants' insurability, even if
applicants bring favourable information.
In the Netherlands, it is considered that strict
regulation will be needed. In 1995, a 5-year
moratorium was extended indefinitely and
insurers have agreed not to use genetic tests or
existing genetic information for policies below
NLG 300'000. Individual responsibility is seen
as being extremely important. Limitations onthe
collection and use of genetic information are
derived from the medical treatment and medical
checks acts.
In Norway, a 1994 biotechnology law allows
strict use of genetic tests. It states that it is
'forbidden torequest, receive, retain ormakeuse
ofgenetic information from a genetic test result,
anditisforbiddentoascertainifagenetictesthas
been performed'. In 1997, Poland introduced a
law, which established ageneral inspectorate for
personal data protection. In Sweden, Genetic
discrimination can be subject to penalty by fine
orprisonsentenceuptoamaximumofsixmonths.
An agreement was reached with the insurance
companies in 1999 not to require insurance
applications to undergo genetic tests up until
2002. Following a referendum in Switzerland in
June 1998, insurers are not allowed to demand
presymptomatic or prenatal investigations as a
condition of insurance.
There is no legislation in Finland, Germany,
Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Italy,PortugalorSpain.
In Ireland the situation is similar to the UK and
although there is no specific legislation, most
Irish insurance companies have organisational
links to the ABI and follow the ABI code where
possible.
REGULATION OF GENETIC TESTING AND
INSURANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In the USA and other countries without national
health services the main concern is about health
insurance where a positive predictive test would
have great relevance although predictive genetic
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tests are rarely able to determine the time at
which someone willbecome ill. IntheUSAmost
healthinsurance ispurchasedonagroupbasisby
employers and the unemployed or low income
groupsareoftennotinsured.Thereisnoobligation
on an employer to insure a high-risk employee
who would raise their costs. Thus 31-36 million
people in the USA have no health insurance[211.
The most significant legislation is the health
insuranceportability andaccountability act 1996
(HIPAA). This federal law provides some
protection from genetic discrimination but only
toemployerbasedandcommerciallyissuedgroup
health insurance. President Clinton in February
2000[22] signed an executive orderforbidding the
USA federal government from using genetic
information in general employment decisions.
Eventually national legislation in the USA is
likely in order to prevent discrimination. Indeed
this has been proposed for some time 231. In the
interim 28 states have already introduced fairly
restrictive legislation, including the recent
Massachusetts law, which prohibits genetic
discriminationbyemployersandhealthinsurance
agents241. Interestingly there does not appear to
be any advantage taken ofthe gap in those states
withoutlaws. ThesituationintheUSAiscovered
partly by the Discrimination act, 1996. Current
bills passing throughtheUS governmentinclude
oneongeneticinformation&non-discrimination
in health insurance 251.
Australia has an Insurance contracts act 1984,
whichallowsinsurerstotakeintoaccountexisting
genetic information as well as family history.
Insurers generally areagainstforcingindividuals
to take genetic tests. The Life, Investment, and
Superannuation Association ofAustralia (LISA)
are currently revising furtherguidelines in 1997.
The genetic privacy and nondiscrimination bill
1998 explicitly prohibits genetic discrimination
by insurers. Canada has no legislation. New
Zealand issued guidelines in April 1997 on
insurance and genetic tests.
BENEFITS OF CANCER GENETIC TESTING
As in Huntington's disease, ifthe genetic nature
oftheconditioniswellenoughdefinedindividuals
may be unable to obtain insurance because they
are at50% risk, irrespective ofDNAtests[61. This
may prompt those atrisk to request testing in the
hope that their 50% prior risk will be reduced to
the point ofbeing able to obtain insurance. This
has not been found to be a particularly important
reason for opting for a test[261, nonetheless some
women who test positive for BRCA1 have had
premiums reduced to normal after prophylactic
mastectomy and oophorectomy.
Thefinding ofnegativetestresults (i.e. non gene
carriers) has been used to lower already high
premiums.IntheUK,insurancecompaniescannot
insist that applicants should have genetic tests.
Manyindividuals atriskandonahigherpremium
will organise genetic tests at their own expense.
Confirmationbygenetictestingofageneticcause
for a cancer in an already affected person does
notautomatically increasetheexistingpremium,
asthis maybebasedonexistingfamilyhistory or
currenthealthstatus,butanegativetestresulthas
led to a reduced premium for some applicants.
Some insurers consider that genetic information
is not essential for underwriting life insurance,
and are notrequesting information about genetic
tests. Most applicants who- were requested to
provide further information were not rated at a
higher premium or rejected. Some companies
consider they can absorb this small extra load.
Overall only 1 in 20policies areactuallyclaimed
on death, which is not an excessive amount.
EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
A surveyofEuropeangenetic centres involvedin
breast cancer testing showed that all the UK
centres surveyed had had patients who refused
testing because offearofpenalty orbeingunable
toobtaininsurance. Two(40%)oftheUKcentres
had experience of patients who refused genetic
testing because of fear of employment
discrimination 271. Interestingly, althoughNorway
hasextremelystrictlaws,andthereisnoparticular
need to discuss insurance issues prior to testing,
instances ofrefusaloftestingduetobothfearand
employment were seen. This mayreflect anxiety
because of strict legislation, as people may
consider there must be something behind the
legislation. Thenon-UKcentresdidnotappearto
have any major discrimination problems.
Casesofactualdiscriminationweredocumented,
allfromUKcentres. Someexamplescitedinclude
a 40 year-old female with relatives with breast
and ovarian cancer who could not obtain
insurance,butwasabletodosoafterpreventative
mastectomy and oophorectomy, and a 39 year-
old female with a BRCA1 family history, who
divorcedfromherhusband, wasdeniedinsurance
and mortgage cover for a new house unless she
had a negative BRCA1 test. Cases were also
documented in which on application for health
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insurance,excessivedetailsofotherfamilyhistory
and genetic test results were requested1281.
A postal survey found that up to 33% of
respondents in patient support groups may have
experienced problems when applying for life
insurance1291. Such findings can easily be
overinterpreted due to a high non-response rate
by more satisfied customers.
In the rest ofEurope where most countries have
restrictive legislation there is little evidence of
discrimination'281, although in Norway, there is
evidenceofincreasedpremiums forHNPCC, but
not for BRCA1/2301.
There is little evidence of discrimination in
obtaining health insurance in the USA for
presymptomaticindividuals1231,nonethelesshealth
insurers are unwilling to pay for testing of for
instance BRCA1, with only 15% covering the
costs1241 and this is likely to increase if the tests
are targeted in the high-risk situation, such as a
family with aknownmutation1311. Unless more is
done to encourage insurers they may not to be
prepared to pay for, for example, an FAP
predictive test, thus denying those on lower
incomes the opportunity for testing in the first
place. Further work in the USA has also shown
that insurance industry's fears about adverse
selection may be groundless. Women testing
positive for BRCAI mutations did not take out
higher levels of life insurance1321.
InAustralia,familieswithhereditarybowelcancer
experienced genetic discrimination. In a survey
offamiliesonthehereditarybowelcancerregister,
Barlow-Stewart found 8% discrimination -
predominantly HNPCC related, and included a
numberofareasincludingrefusaloflifeinsurance,
denial of an increase in life insurance for a pre-
existing policy, refusal ofincome protection and
trauma insurance, reduction of superannuation
andloading on premiums fortravel insurance1331.
One interesting case was that of a civil servant
who reported that her application for a senior
position in the public service was subject to a
negative FAP test result. She had to discontinue
herapplication, as shewouldhavebeenforced to
have atestthatwouldhaverevealedhermutation
status. The issue had been picked up following
her ticking of a regular colonoscopy box on the
health form.
As a result of release of this evidence, the
Australian government has initiated several
enquiries to determine the direction for future
law or other policy development.
HOW CAN PATIENTS WITH A FAMILY HISTORY
OF CANCER ENSURE THE BEST POSSIBLE
MANAGEMENT OF THEIR CONDITION?
Patients, and their clinicians, should be aware of
the regulations on insurance and genetic testing,
the relevant contents of the ABI report and the
recent moratorium on insurance and genetic
testing within the UK. Most of these issues are
complex and patients with a history of familial
cancer need access to a clinical genetics service
either by direct telephone or clinic contact or
through secondary contact via their medical
practitioner or hospital clinician. This is
particularly useful if the risk is being based on
family history, as often patients' knowledge of
their own family history of cancer may be
inaccurate. The introduction of the recent
moratorium and the safeguards contained both
withinitandbyexternalmonitoringofthegenetic
testing aspects by GAIC and the ethical and
social aspects by HGC, is an encouraging step.
Increased use of normal test results in setting
normalpremiumsandindustrycompetitionshould
improve accesstoreasonableinsurancecoverfor
hereditary illnesses and as not all insurance
companies belong to the ABI, good advice is to
'shop around' using an independent advisorwho
may be able to negotiate very competitive rates.
CONCLUSION
Therapidlyevolvingpracticeofclinical genetics
is producing many questions to which we do not
yet have clear answers. This is nowhere more
apparentthaninthegenetics ofcommoncancers,
including breast cancer, which is the fastest
growing area of genetic medicine. Worry about
misuse ofgenetic test information by insurers is
a real occurrence and the recent discussions
between the Government and the insurance
industry leading to their moratorium is to be
welcomed. Little evidence exists on which to
base alotofriskassessmentby insurers oneither
thepredictive powerofcancergenetic tests oron
theuseoffamilyhistoryasaratingfactor.Further
high quality actuarial research evidence will
provide a better understanding of insurance risk
estimation and allow better actuarial practice in
calculation of insurance premiums in families
with a history of cancer.
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